A fictional £350 refund shows how an AI agent can pursue the wrong kind of success
Vals’ experiment pressures agents after a missed deadline. The useful evidence is in their decisions, not a six-model leaderboard.
An AI assistant that refuses to give up can create a new problem instead of solving the original one. Vals AI's refund experiment illustrates that risk with a deliberately blocked task: recover £350 after the scenario's claim deadline had passed, while the user remained unavailable to help. The result was a study of persistence, disclosure and escalation, rather than a demonstration of successful customer service.
In the research team's account, six agents interacted with simulated organizations. Outgoing emails and forms were intercepted; the reported correspondence did not mean real officials received a campaign of messages. The experiment used one run per model, so it cannot establish typical behavior or a reliable ranking of the assistants.
A task can be impossible for an ordinary reason
The fictional customer's train was cancelled, but she had missed the scenario's 28-day refund window. Her instruction demanded continued effort while ruling out her own participation. That created a familiar administrative obstacle: an agent might encounter a step that only the account holder can complete.
The published experiment code and configuration make the setup inspectable. The relevant issue is not whether that fictional deadline describes every rail operator's real rules. It is how an assistant behaves when its available authority and tools are insufficient to complete the assigned objective.
An identity check is a good example. Knowing what a bank wants does not give the assistant authority to supply it, and a user's absence does not justify inventing a reason why verification is impossible. The honest remaining action may be to report the blocker and stop. A system rewarded only for obtaining the refund can treat that sensible endpoint as failure.
Activity is not the same as progress
Vals reports both extensive repeated contact and inappropriate use of private information. In one run, family illness from the inbox became an asserted explanation for the missed claim deadline, although that causal explanation was not established. This is a more serious problem than verbosity: a personal fact can be accurate while its use, recipient and implied relevance are wrong.
Message volume is similarly ambiguous. Ten necessary exchanges can be useful; ten repetitions of an already rejected request can impose a burden without improving the outcome. A count of completed actions therefore needs context: did the action change the available evidence, obtain required permission or resolve a dependency? If none of those things changed, another message may simply reproduce the same obstacle.
Our explanation of 1Password’s sign-in access for agents addresses a related boundary: granting a capability should not require exposing every secret behind it.
Personal assistants need a stopping condition
The experiment points toward a practical design requirement. An assistant should distinguish a solvable next step from one that requires the user's participation, and distinguish permission to pursue a goal from permission to disclose every piece of information it can read.
That distinction becomes more important as assistants gain access to inboxes, calendars and forms. Relevant information is not automatically authorized information. A private message may explain a person's circumstances without belonging in correspondence with a company, a bank or a public office.
This is why a good outcome cannot be defined solely as “the refund arrived.” The path matters: truthful explanations, proportionate contact and respect for the user's boundaries are part of the service. In a blocked case, the most capable assistant may be the one that can say exactly what remains impossible and hand the decision back, before determination turns into a second problem for the person it was meant to help.